

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China's Regional and Provincial Leaders: Roles in the Succession

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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January 1975

CHINA'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS: ROLES IN THE SUCCESSION

CONTENTS

	Page
Introductory Note	1
Principal Judgments	5
The Discussion	8
The Military Regions	8
The Provinces	13
Central Organs of Control	17
The Weight of Regional and Provincial Leaders	20
Prospects	25

FIGURES

	Page
China's Military Regions and Troop Strengths (*map*)	9
Military Region Leaders (*table*)	11
Provincial Party Committees (*table*)	14-15
The Chinese Communist Party Politburo (*table*)	18

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CHINA'S REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEADERS: ROLES IN THE SUCCESSION

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This paper is one of a series addressed to the problem of the succession in China: that is, (a) to the ongoing process of arranging a successor leadership to the present leadership dominated by Mao Tse-tung and strongly influenced by Chou En-lai, and (b) to the shape and nature of that leadership when—probably in the next few years—both Mao and Chou are gone.

This paper attempts to assess the importance of one factor in the problem—China's regional and provincial leaders. That is, what can regional and provincial leaders—especially military leaders—do to help to shape the succession and secure positions in it for themselves? We are talking here primarily about the commanding and first political officers of the 11 Military Regions, the first secretaries of the 29 provincial-level Party Committees, and the leaders of field armies.

For the discussion to be intelligible to readers who are not specialists in Chinese or Communist affairs, a review of some features of the structure of power in China might be useful:

> Prior to the Cultural Revolution in China, regional authority in China was invested primarily in the Chinese Communist Party's regional bureaus, and secondarily in the headquarters of the Military Regions. Both were responsible to central Party organs in Peking.
>
> The first secretaries (dominating figures) of the *Party* regional bureaus had great authority, extending over all of the provinces of their regions. These first secretaries were normally civilians, career Party cadres. The provinces were governed by provincial Party committees, each headed by its own first secretary, also a career Party cadre. The regional bureaus were responsible to the Party Secretariat (and its departments) in Peking, and the provincial committees to the regional bureaus.

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The commanders of the *Military* Regions were also very important figures, whose power was the sum of the powers of subordinate commanders, i.e., the commanders of the armies disposed in the MRs and of the provincial Military Districts which comprised the region. However, authority in each of the MR and MD headquarters (and in the armies) was divided between the commander and the first political officer, with most of it in the hands of the latter. (This of course created command-and-control problems, which remain.)

Normally the first political officer of a Military Region was *not* a career political officer (i.e., a career military man), but rather a career Party cadre whose *principal* post was as first or second second secretary of a *Party* regional bureau. The secretary of a Party regional bureau who doubled as the political officer of a Military Region in his area (there was sometimes more than one MR in the area of a Party Regional bureau) was a much more powerful figure than the MR commander. The same situation obtained at the provincial level, where the first or second secretary of the provincial Party committee usually doubled as first political officer of the provincial MD.

Moreover, the Party apparatus maintained its control over both the commander and the first political officer through the Party *committee* of the MR, MD, or army, as all significant organizations in China have their Party committees. These committees were ultimately answerable to the civilian Party leaders in Peking. The first secretary of the Party committee of each part of the military structure was normally the political officer, giving the Party yet another check on the commander. Further, there was a political security (secret police) network throughout the PLA reporting independently to the Party's central political security organ, controlled by civilians.

This system was badly damaged in the first years (1966-67) of the Cultural Revolution, when China came under *de facto* military rule outside Peking.* Mao abolished the Party's regional bureaus and suspended the provincial committees, and purged the first secretaries of both, leaving the MR leaders as the only *regional*-level authorities and the MD and army leaders as the principal authorities at the provincial level. He purged and reorganized the MRs, MDs and armies, but left them standing. And

* It should be said at once that, if Mao had died at that time or perhaps at any time in the period 1966-70, China might be under a military dictatorship today.

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he purged the political security apparatus

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Because the Party's great Regional Bureaus have not been reconstituted, the Party committees of the *Military Regions* (i.e., of the MR headquarters) and the commanders and first political officers of the MRs (who are secretaries of those committees) are still the only regional-level Party authorities.* There are now 11 MRs, mostly composed of two or more military districts, which are almost all coterminous with the provinces (see map, page 9). The authority of the MR leaders *per se* has extended only to the *Military* structure, not to the provincial and major municipal Party committees within the area of the MR. But since 1969 civilian Party leaders in Peking have shown concern about the problem of controlling the MR leaders—who have been imperfectly responsive to Peking and who have shown a tendency to override the mere provincial leaders in their areas, a problem compounded by the fact that in many cases the MR leaders *were* the provincial leaders, i.e., were concurrently the first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces in which their headquarters were located**

The 29 provincial-level Party committees--26 provinces, three major municipalities—have all been reconstituted. However, the great majority of them, as of August 1971 (when the last was proclaimed), were headed by career military men, and almost half still are—i.e., by military men who are the *de jure* first secretaries, or acting first secretaries, or top-ranking secretaries on the spot. The civilian leaders in Peking have been dissatified with this situation too: the strength and the numbers of military men in the provincial Party apparatus, and their uncertain reliability.

Thus for several years the main organizational issue in China—formulated by Mao himself as early as 1969—has been that of the role of the military, or, more precisely, the problem of reestablishing civilian Party control of the military. This paper reviews the steps which the civilian Party leaders have taken to this end, makes

* The reconstruction of the *Party* regional bureaus might seem one obvious answer to the problem of controlling the *Military* Region leaders, and from time to time the civilian Party leaders in Peking are said to be considering it; but it is apparent that thus far the decision has been that, on balance, there are more potential dangers than benefits in such a reconstruction.

** E.g., a given individual might be concurrently the commander or first political officer of an MR with hundreds of thousands of troops, the first or second Secretary of the Party committee of the MR headquarters, and first secretary of a provincial Party committee.

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calculations as to the degree of success, and offers conjectures as to the weight of the various regional and provincial leaders—emphasizing military figures—in determining the shape of the succession in the months or years ahead and as a part of that successor leadership when it is finally formed.

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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

Mao Tse-tung and other central leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have moved steadily ahead to restore civilian Party control of the governing apparatus in China at the regional and provincial levels, 25X1

[redacted]

A continuing (although probably small-scale) purge of proteges and associates of Lin Piao and other central military leaders who fell in September 1971, and of other leaders for other reasons—mainly for resisting Mao's revolutionary reforms;

The reassignment of military leaders [redacted] 25X1

[redacted], and the loss by these MR commanders of their most important concurrent political posts (e.g., as first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces in which their headquarters were or are located);

The summoning of military leaders to Peking for a prolonged process of examination, self-criticism and thought-reform;

The further subordination of military commanders to political officers who are primarily *Partu* functionaries, and the possible reactivation of a separate political security apparatus to watch them both; and

The reconstruction of the central Party organs to which the regional and provincial bodies are responsible (e.g., the Politburo, the Military Affairs Committee, and the General Political Department), to assure civilian domination of these organs.

These actions appear to have made it very difficult for military leaders outside Peking to conspire and to coordinate with one another (or with central military leaders) any effort to seize the leadership of the Party and regime—either before or after the departure of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. A "military dictatorship" might conceivably come about while the succession is being shaped if there is a Soviet attack or direct intervention by the Peking MR in a period of high instability; but such an attack is regarded by most observers (including

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ourselves) as quite improbable, and intervention by the Peking MR seems unlikely to have the objective of purely military dominance.

There does not seem to be much that regional and provincial leaders outside Peking—at least in those roles—can do to make their weight felt in determining the shape of the succession. They do not constitute a unified, purposive group. While the military figures command the physical force to make them a concern to Peking, the various possible scenarios in which regional military power could conceivably be brought to bear do not seem credible:

> No single MR outside Peking could possibly conduct a successful offensive against the capital; and even if the leaders of a *group* of MRs could conspire successfully, they probably lack the personal followings, and are subject to too many controls, to get the bulk of their forces to follow them.
>
> While bombers or missiles located in the various MRs could conceivably be used against Peking, the probability is that the command-and-control system is secure.
>
> While a challenge by a key MR or group of MRs supported by the Soviets may—as some believe—be a stronger possibility, Chinese visibly in league with the Russians would probably be swiftly disposed of by other Chinese; and a joint operation would in any case rule out the possibility—which Moscow is awaiting—of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations by political means.
>
> And there is not likely to be a collapse of public order which could return the military to political power throughout China, as the civilian leaders since 1968 have taken and will continue to take great care to keep mass campaigns under control.

The Peking MR itself, however, may be worth serious and continuing concern, as it might be able to intervene decisively in a leadership crisis; the leaders of this MR might be "king-makers." While an orderly transfer of power seems a better possibility, in a struggle for power the Peking MR is strategically by far the most important MR.

Six of the regional leaders (MR commanders and career Party cadres serving as MR political officers) who are full members of the Politburo will probably have influence as individuals in shaping the leadership, as Mao and Chou are likely to consult them in making key appointments, and to put some appointments to a vote in the Politburo. But the central leadership will essentially be worked out by the present leaders in Peking, and, while it will include regional

as well as central military leaders, career Party cadres will probably be the dominant group.

In the period in which the new leadership is being shaped, the regional and provincial leaders will probably do well not to take initiatives, to offer their opinions only when asked, and to try to retain favor with whatever central leadership is in power. Most of the current regional and provincial leaders will probably survive to the succession. A successor leadership—bound to feel less secure than the present leadership—may then be more active in seeking the favor of regional and provincial leaders, who thereafter may acquire more substantial influence on the decisions made in Peking than they appear to have now.*

* It is only fair to concede at the outset that some close observers of the Chinese scene believe that regional and provincial leaders *now* exercise strong influence on Peking—stronger than this paper at any point imputes to them. As those observers see it, there exist networks of alliances between regional and provincial figures on one hand and central leaders on the other—alliances varying in strength, and based on past relationships, policy issues, and political self-interest. Further, as they see it, the pattern of purges, transfers and promotions since the fall of Lin Piao's group seems related to the rise of "moderate" elements in the central leadership, elements which are now active—i.e., more active than we believe—in seeking the favor of regional and provincial leaders, who are thereby able to influence—i.e., influence more substantially than we believe—the shape of the leadership and of its policies.

THE DISCUSSION

The Military Regions

Five of the 11 Military Region headquarters were reorganized—entailing the transfer or purge or death of either the commander or first political officer or of both of them—prior to the Lin Piao affair of 1971, some of them more than once. The most important of these was the unpublicized reorganization of the Peking MR in 1970, which removed both the commander and first political officer (both charged with conspiring against Mao) and replaced them with Li Te-sheng and Chi Teng-kuei, both alternate members of the Politburo brought in from provincial posts.*

Five of these MRs—including two (again) of the above-cited five—were reorganized in the wake of the Lin Piao affair. The commanders of the Chengtu and Sinkiang MRs, and the first political officers of the Fuchow and Wuhan MRs, were purged, all for alleged conspiracy with Lin Piao; and the first political officer of the Canton MR, although a man close to both Lin and the purged chief-of-staff, was transferred to become first political officer of the Chengtu MR, apparently having managed (with the help of Chou En-lai) to clear himself. This left only three MRs—Shenyang, Tsinan, and Nanking—which had remained stable through the Cultural Revolution and the Lin affair.

As of mid-1973, three of the MRs (Fuchow, Canton, Wuhan) were still commanded by proteges of Lin Piao, and a fourth MR (Chengtu, cited above) had as its first political officer another Lin protege. Moreover, leading officers of some other MRs were men who had at least been shown favor by Lin. It was therefore not hard to conclude, as of mid-1973, that some of the military leaders then in place in the MR headquarters might be purged later (as Mao got around to them), and that others, less clear-cut cases, would probably be reassigned.* The first political officer of one MR (Tsinan), it was later learned, was in fact purged at about that time, although apparently not for supporting Lin.

Mao's next move was much more spectacular than had been anticipated. This was the mass transfer of eight MR commanders, in December 1973, in four paired exchanges: Peking-Shenyang (by far the most important), Canton-Nanking, Tsinan-Wuhan, and Fuchow-Lanchow. The political officers of the eight MRs remained in place, and the transferred commanders were not permitted to take any of their deputy commanders with them—meaning that each would begin with an entirely new team. Moreover, six of the eight had been the first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces in which their MR headquarters were located and a seventh the first secretary of another provincial Party committee, and none of the eight was given the first secretaryship of the corresponding province in his new assignment. (In the three MRs unaffected by the transfers, the first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces containing MR headquarters were not the MR commanders, but rather the first political officers.) In other words, each of the eight transferred commanders had been deprived of his "mountain stronghold" or "independent kingdom," and knew it.** [redacted] Mao himself ordered these actions, in what was the most striking display of his confidence in his ability to exact obedience since the summer of 1971, immediately preceding

[redacted]

*The failure to publicize these appointments at the time—although both were soon reliably indicated or reported—might be explained either (a) by Mao's unwillingness to reveal that he was preparing to purge a group of central military leaders, including his designated successor, or (b) by Mao's uncertainty as to whether these two would work out.

**This is not to say that they all *were* operating "independent kingdoms," but some potential was there.

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

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the purge of Lin's group—at which time Mao (ac- had toured South and East China, talked with MR leaders, stated his intention to purge some central military leaders (he did not name Lin), and, while seeking the support of MR leaders, had in effect challenged them to defy him. (Mao had been right: the great majority of the MR leaders, however many of them may have privately sympathized with Lin's group, failed to support Lin in any practical way when the crisis came in September.)

It was uncertain, however, at the time of the mass transfers (December 1973), which of the eight commanders were actually in serious disfavor (marked for purging) or under suspicion (to be put on probation, for examination, self-criticism and thought reform).

In the Peking-Shenyang exchange, for example, Chen Hsi-lien acquired the militarily strongest and politically most important Peking MR, and Li Te-sheng acquired the militarily most critical Shenyang MR (where the Sino-Soviet military confrontation was most serious); but Li presumably lost his post as Director of the General Political Department of the Military Affairs Committee (MAC), a duty which could not be effectively discharged from Shenyang.

In the Canton-Nanking exchange, the onetime Lin Piao protege Ting Sheng, then in apparent favor, went to Nanking, and a military leader at one time close to Mao, Hsu Shih-yu, to Canton.

In the Tsinan-Wuhan exchange, the longtime Lin protege Tseng Szu-yu went to Tsinan, the Lin-favored Yang Te-chih to Wuhan.*

In the Fuchow-Lanchow exchange, the longtime Lin protege Han Hsien-chu went to Lanchow, the Lin-favored Pi Ting-chun to Fuchow.

It was not possible to accept at face value the Party's assertion that these actions were taken simply in accordance with Mao's earlier-stated position that military leaders should be rotated more frequently for various good reasons; although he had in fact said this, there was a lack of advance notice and a pointed absence of ceremony in these reassignments, and the status of most of the commanders was notably diminished.* One could *conjecture* that in each case Mao had confidence in one of the two commanders involved but had marked for purging or for further examination the other (the latter being Li, Ting, Tseng, and Han: Li as the largest loser, the other three as those closest to Lin Piao). Or one could conjecture that Mao meant to bring down all or almost all of them, one or two at a time. But the only really clear thing was that Mao had shown his power, as part of the continuing campaign to put the military in its place and keep it there.**

The status of most of the MR commanders is still in some doubt.*** Only three—Chen Hsi-lien in Peking, who was a member of the group investi-

*The terms "protege," "close," and "favored," are shorthand, and unsatisfactory. "Protege" is used to denote a professional relationship of many years in which the man appears to owe his rise in large part to sponsorship by an important patron. "Close" has a more personal connotation, e.g., Mao protected Hsu during the Cultural Revolution despite the absence of a professional patron-protege relationship. "Favored" means simply that the man in question got his most important posts when the other man was in a position to assign them.

*However, it is possible, as another observer has conjectured, that Chou En-lai's unexplained visits to Shenyang and Nanking in 1973 were to give advance notice to Chen Hsi-lien, said to be close to Chou, and to Hsu Shih-yu, a onetime favorite of Mao's. Yet another observer sees Chou's Shenyang trip as an effort to dissuade the MR leader from permitting the press in his area to attack educational policies favored by Chou (an instance of a central leader seeking support from a regional figure), and regards Mao's favor for Hsu as being quite insecure, as Hsu may have been under examination during his prolonged absence from the news in 1971-72.

**The MR commanders were not being discriminated against, i.e., measures taken to restrict their authority were not more severe than those taken to restrict central military leaders. There is evidence that even before the fall of Lin Piao, military leaders in Peking—including Lin—had to have civilian Party leaders' approval of their orders, and

***It is hard to tell from appearances whether a given Military Region is stable. Some *look* stable, with their leading officers appearing regularly; but any MR can be purged or reorganized at any time. Some *look* unstable, with their leaders out of sight for months and possibly or even probably under investigation; when the leaders reappear (as several did, on National Day), they may have genuinely cleared themselves, or they may be only nominally in their posts, marked for purging some months from now.

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MR commanders look to be—or possibly to be—in some degree of trouble.

a. Li Te-sheng in Shenyang, a Vice-Chairman of the Party and a member of the Politburo standing committee, the second-ranking military man in China after August 1973 and regarded as a dark-horse candidate for Party Chairman, has been under poster attack in several places (including Shenyang), has apparently not been functioning as head of the General Political Department, and is charged privately by other leaders with having made "serious" mistakes (possibly in connection with the Lin Piao affair, as he too was a member of the investigation group), although it is also said that Li may still come out all right after self-criticism; he may indeed manage to keep his post in Shenyang (where he continues to appear), but it will be a surprise if he returns to the inner circle of Party leaders.*

[redacted]

c. Hsu Shih-yu in Canton, despite evidence [redacted] regarded by 25X1 Lin Piao's group as a hard-core Mao-supporter and that he has been helping with the purge of the MR most packed with proteges of Lin's group, and despite the fact that he has not been out of sight since August 1972 (when his own examination, if any, was presumably completed), was being attacked in posters in his former command as late as November

gating the Lin Piao affair and who seems to be in high favor, and Chin Chi-wei in Chengtu and Yang Yung in Sinkiang, both rehabilitated leaders who were not involved in the mass transfer of December 1973—seem secure.* The other eight

*One observer has surmised that the rehabilitation of Yang Cheng-wu, who criticized Chen during the Cultural Revolution, may portend trouble for Chen. As we see it, however, the indicators of high favor for Chen, on the part of the most powerful central figures, are strong.

*The press communique of the first session of fourth National People's Congress, released after this paper went to press, suggests that Li has lost his positions as Vice-Chairman of the Party and member of the Politburo standing committee.

**The term "missing" means: unidentified in Chinese media for an unusually long time and/or in circumstances in which the person would be expected to appear but does not. The "missing" designator is to a degree arbitrary, depending on the observer's calculations of the vagaries of various media and his sense of the situation. But it has proved to be a useful tool: most of the "missing" do not return, or return only after a prolonged period in which—as often confirmed by unofficial reporting—they have been in political trouble.

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1974, and it is conceivable that his case is being re-opened.

d. Wang Pi-cheng in Kunming, missing between April and October, has reportedly been attacked in posters, and, as with Ting Sheng, his return to the news does not necessarily mean that he has satisfied Peking.

e. Han Hsien-chu has been missing from Lanchow since January 1974, and has been attacked in posters [redacted] as a Lin-follower; Han, like Li Te-sheng, has been said to have a chance for rehabilitation through self-criticism (he appeared in Peking on National Day, and is probably undergoing examination) but his association with Lin Piao was in fact so close that it is a wonder how he has lasted this long.

f. Tseng Szu-yu in Tsinan is still appearing, but has been under poster attack, and has been variously reported as being officially named as a Lin-supporter, as being cleared, and as being in the process of rehabilitation through self-criticism; he too as a longtime Lin protege is highly vulnerable.

g. Pi Ting-chun in Fuchow, missing for months in 1972 and 1973 and again from August until early November in 1974, seems to be in the same uncertain situation as do Ting Sheng and Wang Pi-cheng above—uncertain as to whether he is really out of danger.

h. Yang Te-chih in Wuhan is still appearing, [redacted] is said to be in the category of those who might be saved through self-criticism.

It seems fair to conclude that some of these eight MR commanders—even if only one or two—will fall.*

Only one of the first political officers of these MRs (apart from the Tsinan man purged a year ago) seems to be in possibly serious trouble. This is Liu Hsing-yuan in Chengtu, a longtime protege of Lin Piao and closely associated with others of Lin's group, who reportedly was cleared of complicity in the Lin affair after a long investigation and was reassigned from Canton to Chengtu as first political officer of the MR and first secretary of the Szechuan provincial Party committee (he still has both posts). Liu was missing between March and October, reported as under arrest and investigation; he is among those whose records make them highly vulnerable. Some of the other first political officers have been attacked in posters or have been reported to be in some kind of minor trouble, but thus far Liu is the only one who seems still to be on the possibly critical list.

Many of the senior deputy commanders and senior political officers—i.e., just below the level of commanders and first political officers—of these MRs are missing, and/or credibly reported to be in serious trouble. Among the best-known of these: Fu Chia-hsuan and Hsu Li-ching (political) of Tsinan, both missing since February; Liao Jung-piao, Hsiao Yung-yin, Tu Ping (political) and Chou Kuan-wu (political) of Nanking, all missing since March; Chen Tsai-tao and Wang Chien-an (political) of Fuchow, both missing for a year; Huang Jung-hai, Wen Nien-sheng, and Jen Szu-chung (political) of Canton, only one missing but all closely associated with Lin Piao's group, and two credibly reported as in danger of being purged; and Fang Ming of Wuhan, missing for a year. It seems highly probable that some of this group too will fall.

The Party committees of the MR headquarters are the supreme *regional* organs, to which the most important orders come and from which they go forth. At all levels, prior to the Cultural Revolution, it was normally the case that the first political officer rather than the commander was the first secretary of the Party committee.* In recent years only one first secretary of an MR headquarters has been reliably identified—the first political officer,

*Some of these men may owe their survival of the Lin affair to Peking's wish to make clear that past association with Lin was not in itself sufficient reason for purging anyone; this point having been made, each case can be examined again—and again and again—on its "merits."

*A major article in *People's Daily* of 13 November emphasizes the importance of the Party committees of the PLA and charges that Lin Piao tried to weaken this "system of collective leadership"—a sure sign that the civilian Party leaders intend to strengthen it, as, indeed, the article goes on to say that they are doing. Other propaganda continues to make the point that local PLA units (including their Party committees) should seek guidance from and report more frequently to the strengthened local (usually civilian-dominated) Party committees.

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although one military commander (since transferred) made one appearance suggesting that he might have had the post. It seems very probable that in most if not all of the MR headquarters now the first political officer is concurrently the first secretary of the Party committee.* It would be inconsistent with the other measures taken to reduce the powers of the MR commanders if Peking were to make *them* the first secretaries of these Party committees. In three cases—Peking, Shenyang, Canton—the military commander is a member of the Politburo, but in two of those three cases so is the first political officer, so the question of subordination of a Politburo member to a non-member does not arise; and in the other case (Shenyang) the status of the commander himself is very much in doubt, so much so that he seems unlikely to be functioning (even if he has the title) as first secretary of the Party committee of his new command.**

In sum, most of the MR commanders are comparatively new to their posts (about a year), they are cut off from their longtime associates, few if any are the first secretaries of the Party committees of their headquarters, none is known to be the first secretary of the Party committee of the province in which his headquarters is located, none is allowed to make important decisions (except in military emergencies) on his own, none is allowed to issue orders except as approved by the first political officer, and—probably, although this cannot be proved—few are able to communicate on important matters up, down, or laterally except through the political officer.*** Moreover, several are under fire. The position of the first political officers is, in general, much stronger. They have been in their posts much longer, they are not isolated, they are probably in most cases the first secretaries of the Party committees of their headquarters, several are known to be the first or acting first secretaries of their provinces, they have much greater authority, and only one seems to be in possibly serious danger. The MR commanders have sometimes been presented by foreign journalists as being so powerful that they could impose their will on Peking. As we see it, they not only cannot do that but, if secretly hostile to Peking, are in a poor position to try to conspire with others even in their own commands, and in an even weaker position for an attempt to conspire with like-minded commanders in other MRs.*

The above is true even without considering the possible operations of a political security apparatus independent of the political officer system, i.e., with separate offices and separate reporting channels. As of mid-1973, it was rumored that such an apparatus was again being set up, under Mao's political security chief. Nothing has been learned of it since, although if a monitoring system does exist, the system may serve it. If the political security apparatus itself exists, the MR commander has yet another watchdog watching him (and watching the political officer as well). This function could be placed in the hands of a subordinate political officer of the MR or a civilian secretary of the provincial Party committee, doubling in the security apparatus.

The Provinces

As of September 1971, when Lin's group of central leaders fell, the first secretaries of 20 of the 29 provincial-level Party committees (the 26 provinces, and the major municipalities of Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin) were career military men, and career military men were among the several subordinate secretaries of each committee (in the majority in many). About 60 percent of all identified provincial secretaries (meaning first secretaries and suberdi-

[redacted]

**The 13 November article previously cited contends that Lin Piao always favored the subordination if not the outright elimination of the political officers—again, a sure sign that the Party intends to enhance the authority of the political officers vis-a-vis the commanders, who constitute the majority of the past and potential "individual careerists" in the PLA whom the article denounces.

[redacted]

*As other observers have noted, some of Peking's propaganda on the relationship between the Party and the PLA suggests that at least some PLA leaders have been evading or attempting to evade the elaborate machinery set up to control them. The machinery is no doubt imperfect, but it is probably good enough to apprehend an attempted conspiracy against the central leaders, or at least to apprehend the conspirators before they can strike (as was the case even in 1971, in the Lin Piao affair).

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Party cadres. Of the new secretaries identified between September 1971 and mid-1973, the great majority were career Party cadres.

Since July 1973, the trend has continued, if still undramatically. Career military men no longer constitute a majority of the provincial-level ranking secretaries. Of the 29 such positions (23 identified first secretaries, 6 acting first secretaries or ranking secretaries on the spot, heading the lists in local turnouts), 15 are held by career Party cadres, 14 by career military men, some of them still not identified in military posts.* (Of the 14 PLA figures, 6 are career military commanders, 5 are career political officers, and 3 have had mixed careers.) Moreover, of the 14 PLA figures, 4 are missing from their posts and are known or believed to be in Peking, probably undergoing examination (and in one of the four cases, the man left in charge is missing altogether, unlocated anywhere), and 1 is believed to be still in jeopardy, despite his recent identification in his post. By contrast, none of the old Party cadres who are first or acting first secretaries seems to have his status in question. And again, the great majority of new subordinate secretaries have been Party cadres (some of them one-time "mass representatives").

Of the five career military men (cited immediately above) whose status is questionable in their provincial leadership posts, only one has a record of close association with Lin Piao, and that one is concurrently an *MR* leader. The provincial-level picture is in this respect in sharp contrast to the picture at the MR level, where seven of the nine MR leaders who appear to be or possibly to be in some degree of trouble were either Lin's longtime proteges or markedly favored by him.* At least at the provincial level, the question of possible involvement with Lin has probably been less important in determining an individual's fate than that person's attitude toward the current "*criticize Lin Piao and Confucius*" campaign. Whereas at the regional level several Lin-associated cases may remain unresolved, at the provincial level the anti-Lin and anti-Confucius campaign has probably been affecting primarily those who are said to be Lin's "supporters" in the special sense of continuing to resist the revolutionary reforms instituted by Mao in the Cultural Revolution and being reaffirmed in the current "continuation" of that Revolution.**

Several Military District (i.e., provincial) commanders and political officers who are *not* the first secretaries of their provincial Party committees (although they are normally if not always among the subordinate secretaries) have been out of sight long enough to be regarded as "missing." Military District leaders without concurrent important political positions comprise a category difficult to assess in terms of a purge, because many of these commanders and first political officers [redacted] do not appear regularly. However, there were some 18 MD commanders and 18 first political officers (apart from the first secretaries considered earlier) regarded as suitably identified and active as of mid-1973, and who thus provide some basis for estimating how many provincial military figures important primarily as *military* leaders have been purged or removed for examination since that time. Of these 36 leaders, 6 commanders and 7 political officers, all of them career military men, are missing. If the same proportion of the unidentified occupants of comparable posts also cannot be accounted for, 4 or 5 more may be added to the list. And if past exercises with the "missing" provide a reliable guide, most of these 17 or 18 leaders will not reappear in their posts.

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*Of the seven provincial Party committee first secretaryships vacated by the mass transfer of MR commanders, three are known to have been filled, and a fourth appears to have been—all by career Party cadres. In the other three cases, the men who appear to be ranking secretaries on the spot are career military, who will probably be replaced by career Party cadres. On the other hand, one career military man—Lu Jui-lin in Kweichow—was named first secretary of his provincial Party committee as recently as summer 1974, indicating—as other observers have noted—that in some special cases e.g., provinces like Kweichow which have been severely troubled for years, the civilians in Peking genuinely prefer to have a reliable military man in charge.

**In other words, Lin had brought his proteges to power at the regional level, but had been much less concerned to do so at the provincial level, so it is only to be expected that a much higher proportion of MR leaders than of lower-level leaders has been purged or examined for connections with Lin.

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Here again the likely common charge is not conspiracy with Lin Piao (very few have records of association with Lin), but opposition to the continuing "revolution."*

As of mid-1973, about 200 provincial-level secretaries of all types (career military, career Party cadres, mass representatives) had been identified. Some 31 of these were carried at that time as "missing," most of them military, and almost all of that military group were persons known or believed to have been involved or caught up in the Lin Piao affair. Of the 31: 13 are still missing, almost all of them Lin-associated; 6 appeared at least once after mid-1973 but are again missing; 11 have reappeared as active secretaries, mostly career Party cadres whose absence in mid-1973 could not be explained, but none of them Lin-associated; and 1 (Lin-associated) has been reassigned, to a non-secretarial post. Replacements since mid-1973 have brought the total number of identified secretaries to about 200 again, but of these some 30 to 40 are "missing"—in addition to the 19 still or again missing from the mid-1973 group.** The true figure, for those who have fallen since mid-1973, may be 20 to 25. Whatever the precise figure, most of the missing are, again, career military men, although only a few of these are linked (by their careers or in Party charges) with Lin Piao. This picture, for secretaries of all types, is consistent with the picture for military men only, considered earlier: that what counted most in 1974 was one's behavior in the *campaign*.

Central Organs of Control

Some anticipated steps to control the military leaders outside Peking by the civilian Party leaders in Peking have in fact been taken since mid-1973. The most important of them relate to the reconstitution of the central Party organs to which the regional and provincial military leaders are responsible, e.g., the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the Military Affairs Committee (MAC, responsible to the Politburo Standing Committee), and the General Political Department (GPD, in recent years an organ *of* the MAC as well as—more loosely—of the PLA).*

The Politburo named in August 1973 included among its 21 full (voting) members 6 career military men, 4 of them still active, but it submerged them in 15 career Party cadres, all but 2 still active (and 6 of whom were concurrently political officers); the one full member added since (Teng Hsiao-ping) is an old Party cadre who spent part of his career as a political officer. The 6 active members of the Politburo Standing Committee include 2 of the above 4 active military men, but 1 of the 2 (Li Te-sheng) was sent out of Peking in December (to command the Shenyang MR) and probably out of the inner circle at the same time, leaving only the reliable old comrade of Mao and Chou, Yeh Chien-ying, as the PLA representative on the Standing Committee.

Striking changes in the leadership of the MAC, the central organ in the development, control and employment of the PLA, have been credibly reported. Although Mao has remained its Chairman,** for a time its other officers (vice-chairmen and

*The Military Affairs Committee is normally given by Peking in English as "Military Commission." We prefer MAC.

**Regime media are careful to acknowledge, even to emphasize, that Mao is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. There is an ironic "contradiction," noted by other observers, between the insistence that Mao personally commands the PLA and the insistence at the same time that the *Party* "commands the gun." This parallels the situation in the Party itself, in which Mao is both the Chairman of the Party and "above" the Party.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY POLITBURO

Politburo Standing Committee, in order of rank:	
Mao Tse-tung	Chairman, Chinese Communist Party; Chairman, Military Affairs Committee
Chou En-lai (ill)	Vice-Chairman, CCP; Premier
Wang Hung-wen	Vice-Chairman, CCP; ?Senior Vice-Chairman, MAC
Kang Sheng (inactive)	Vice-Chairman, CCP
Yeh Chien-ying	Vice-Chairman, CCP; Vice Chairman, MAC; Acting C/S
Teng Hsiao-ping*	Vice-Chairman, CCP; senior Vice-Premier; ?Secretary-General, MAC
Chu Te (inactive)	Chairman, National People's Congress
Chang Chun-chiao	?Secretary-General, CCP; ?Vice-Chairman, MAC; 1st PolOff, Nanking MR; 1st Secretary, Shanghai Committee
Tung Pi-wu (inactive)	
Other Full (Voting) Members, in approximate order of rank:	
Chiang Ching	Mao Tse-tung's wife; "cultural" specialist
Yao Wen-yuan	?Director, Propaganda Department; 2nd Secretary, Shanghai Committee
Li Hsien-nien	Vice Premier
Li Te-sheng*	Commander, Shenyang MR
Liu Po-cheng (inactive)	Vice-Chairman, NPC
Chen Hsi-lien	Commander, Peking MR; ?MAC
Chi Teng-kuei	1st PolOff, Peking MR; ?labor specialist; ?MAC
Hua Kuo-feng	Agriculture specialist; 1st Secretary, Hunan Committee; newly-named Minister of Public Security*
Hsu Shih-yu	Commander, Canton MR; ?MAC
Wang Tung-hsing	Dir., Staff Office, Central Committee; political security specialist; ?MAC
Chen Yung-kuei	Secretary, Shansi Committee; peasant
Wu Te	1st Secretary, Peking Committee; 2nd PolOff, Peking MR; ?1st PolOff, Peking Garrison
Wei Kuo-ching	1st PolOff, Canton MR; 1st Secretary, Kwangsi Committee

*Reflecting the just-released proceedings of the Party plenum and the NPC.

secretary-general) and other members of its Standing Committee were reported to be almost all members of Lin Piao's group, and even after Lin's death were said to be almost all career military men. By July 1973 old Party cadres with concurrent political officer posts or political security backgrounds were being reported as moved or about to be moved into it. In recent months, young Wang Hung-wen (Mao's choice to be his—Mao's—eventual if not immediate successor) is said to have succeeded old Yeh Chien-ying as the senior vice-chairman of the MAC (Wang ranks above Yeh among the Politburo vice-chairmen), meaning that Wang is its *de facto* chief during Mao's long absences; this is consistent with many reports of Wang marching around in a PLA uniform, a fact not adequately explained by his onetime post as first political officer of the Shanghai Garrison,

where he is no longer active.* Chang Chun-chiao, who may be the Party's *de facto* Secretary-General and in any case is active with Wang at the top of the Party apparatus, is said to have been added also as a vice-chairman, ranking after Yeh. And the rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-ping, the Party's last known Secretary-General (before the Cultural Revolution) who is again working in the Party apparatus, has been said to be in charge of the "daily affairs" of the MAC; this would place Teng in the *MAC* Secretary-General's post, heading the MAC's Staff Office (which we presume still exists). It is a good bet that some other Politburo members who are both career Party cadres and currently political officers have also been added to the MAC Standing Committee, and that Wang Tung-hsing, Mao's personal political security man, has been added as well.** In sum, a formidable complex of career Party cadres now appears to dominate both the Party apparatus and the leadership of the MAC, with the career military men effectually subordinated.***

As suggested above, Li Te-sheng almost certainly has not been acting during 1974 as Director of the General Political Department, the department concerned wtih indoctrination and surveillance of the PLA as a whole, and with the overall evaluation of senior officers. Li's specific task in investigating the Lin Piao affair was reportedly that of evaluating materials collected by other members of the group, and his present troubles may derive from the judgment that he did this poorly, i.e., too conservatively; in any case, his transfer removes a career commander from the directorship of the department evaluating other career commanders, and may be disheartening to them on those grounds, although there are credible rumors that some military leaders resented Li's rapid rise.

likely that political work in the PLA is not being directed by career military men, not even by career political officers, but, again, by career Party cadres. (Career political officers appear as *deputy* directors of the GPD.)

The only other central organ concerned with control of the military—i.e., the only one worth considering—is the General Staff, the central executive, coordinating and planning organ for military operations. Although old Yeh Chien-ying has been reported since Lin Piao's fall to be Acting Minister of Defense as well as Acting Chief-of-Staff, the Ministry of Defense for years (even before Lin's fall) has seemed to be an unnecessary echelon between the MAC and the General Staff; the Deputy Ministers and other officers appear largely in liaison roles with foreign visitors. The MAC may conceivably use the MND as a conduit to the General Staff, but it is the General Staff that is visibly active, sending orders from its various departments to every part of China.* So far as is known, and as would be expected, the General Staff leadership consists entirely of career military men. Yeh Chien-ying is said to have been still the Acting C/S as of December 1974, but it is possible that either Chang Tsai-chien, who has apparently been the ranking Deputy Chief-of-Staff in recent years, or Yang Cheng-wu, who was acting Chief-of-Staff when he was brought down in the Cultural Revolution (he has recently been rehabilitated), has been marked to replace him.** Whoever is in

*It is also consistent with the remark attributed to him in what appears to be an authentic speech, sometime in the past year: "I [Wang] have recommended that a man in his 30s be put in command of a Military Region."

*The recently-concluded NPC named Yeh as Minister of National Defense, no longer simply "acting"; nothing was said about the C/S position.

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the post, the General Staff can probably now—after the fall of three Chiefs-of-Staff in the period 1965-1971—be relied on to do what the more powerful *Party* organs tell it to do. The Party is keeping the Lin Piao affair—the failure of even the most highly-placed military men to defy the civilian leaders—fresh in the minds of all military men who may be disposed to disobey orders; and the first secretary of the Party committee of the General Staff—possibly, the Acting Chief—will ensure the Party's continuing scrutiny of the Staff.*

The Weight of Regional and Provincial Leaders

The question remains as to what regional and provincial leaders—especially military leaders—can do to make their weight felt in determining the shape of the succession.

The first, and obvious, point is that it is not a question of "their" weight, in the sense of a unified, purposive group bringing its aggregate influence to bear. There are differences of interest and inclination between military leaders as a group and career Party cadres as a group (career Party cadres including both old Party cadres and young Party cadres, the latter including "mass representatives" who became young Party cadres when they joined Party organizations), and among the members themselves of these groups. The military *tend* to be more "conservative," in the traditional sense, than the more highly politicized Party cadres, but there are opportunists, there are service rivalries, policy differences, and competition for position. The Party leaders are in a somewhat adversary relationship as the "leaders" of the military and "commanders" of the gun, but have wide differences on matters of policy and are forced to compete even more sharply for position.

The morale of the career Party cadres is of course important to the leadership in Peking. Those leaders have worked steadily in recent years to restore the Party to its dominance of the society, to "rehabilitate" as many as possible of the older cadres brought down in the Cultural Revolution, and to elevate many younger cadres.* The leaders in Peking will want the approval of these career Party cadres for whatever arrangements for the leadership are worked out in Peking, and symbols of both the older, rehabilitated cadres (e.g., Teng Hsiao-ping) and of the younger, elevated cadres (several members of the current Politburo) are sure to be included. But the point here is that the leaders in Peking do not have to regard figures of the provincial-level Party apparatus, who do not dispose of much power, as a critical factor in making their arrangements—provided that the arrangements made are not for a military dictatorship. The latter would provoke such disaffection among the many millions of career Party cadres throughout China that the central leadership would have serious trouble in getting its policies implemented, the military establishment being both too small and insufficiently competent to run the entire country by itself. But there is no chance that the present Party leaders are going to *arrange* a military dictatorship, i.e., that they will deliberately put themselves out of business.

The group really worth worrying about, for the present Party leaders, is the military, for the obvious reason that the military represents the principal element of force outside Peking to be considered in the calculations of those inside Peking.** Even if

*The rehabilitated Yang Cheng-wu was reportedly the first secretary of the Party committee of the General Staff when he fell in 1968; he may get the post again. Yang's fortunes are of special interest, because his principal apparent offense in 1968 was that of challenging the authority of Madame Mao.

Beyond the question of the Party committee, if the previously-cited political security apparatus operating independently of the political officer system is again in being, one can be sure that its operatives are in place in the General Staff.

*It is sometimes said that the younger cadres identify with the militia, and that some of them—e.g., Wang Hung-wen—are deliberately building a power base on the militia. It is impossible, however, to regard the militia as being an effective force—or as being used as such by any given Chinese leader—in the maneuvering for position among top-level figures in Peking. It could nowhere stand up to the PLA, and, if an asset at all, is such at the municipal and county, not national, level. It seems to be under a mixed system of Party and PLA control, with the trend toward increasing Party control and restricting the PLA to support.

**The leaders in Peking will wish to have the approval—something more than mechanical obedience—of the MR leaders, just as of the provincial Party cadres, if for no other reason than that satisfied subordinates will do a better job in carrying out orders than will malcontents. But the main consideration has got to be *power*.

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"the military" could in general agree that the best of all possible arrangements would indeed be a military dictatorship, the actions taken by the Party in the past few years to resubordinate the military establishment make it seem most unlikely that any cabal of military leaders in the regions can be poised to impose itself after Mao's and/or Chou's departure.* Only if the Soviets judged that conditions in China during the succession were highly unstable and therefore offered a propitious time to attack China, or in the very special case (to be discussed later) of direct intervention by the Peking MR, would anything which could be described as a "military dictatorship" seem even possible. We regard a Soviet attack as improbable (because the Russians will wish to sort out whatever new leadership emerges), and, as we see it, any intervention by the Peking MR is unlikely to aim at purely military dominance.

Most observers would probably agree that "the military," with few important exceptions, would prefer to see the relatively moderate and dependable Chou En-lai or someone like him become the next Chairman, rather than the militant and unstable Madame Mao or someone like her. But even if the military were able to unite in support of Chou, he seems at best a short-term candidate; he is very ill and may die before Mao does. Alternatively, could the military turn to one of its own in the leadership? To Yeh Chien-ying, who has something like the same reputation as a moderate and fair-minded man that Chou does? But Yeh is the same age as Chou, [redacted] Or to Li Te-sheng, like Yeh a career military man and a Party vice-chairman? But Li's position is already precarious, dependent on the good will of the civilian Party leaders in Peking (where he is not). Chen Hsi-lien is a strong and active central figure, but he ranks below the vice-chairmen and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee from whom the next Chairman, if any, will presumably be chosen.

All this is not to dismiss the possible importance of *central* military leaders in influencing the shape of the succession, as there are several in addition to Yeh and Chen—e.g., other officers of the Peking MR and of the Peking Garrison, and of the General Staff and the Air Force and Armored Forces and Artillery—whose possible roles deserve consideration. But this question of the role of *central* military leaders (apart from the leaders of the Peking MR) is a separate question, and merits separate treatment, in a study addressed to the central leadership as a whole. The question posed in this paper—within the terms of this paper—is that of what the *regional and provincial* leaders (especially MR, MD and field army leaders) can actually do to influence what they probably see—as do we—as the shape of the succession: the absence of a single dominant figure like Mao, and instead an uneasy coalition under the banner of "collective" leadership.*

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The Military Region leaders were sometimes seen by foreign observers as having been, at some points during the Cultural Revolution, in such a strong position as to invite themselves to Peking in order to make demands on the central lead rs. [redacted] all such gatherings in fact represented the *summoning* of such leaders to Peking, to be told of the central leaders' plans and to be given marching orders.) It did and still does seem likely that in the period of Mao's heavy dependence upon the PLA he was sometimes amenable to the influence of MR leaders (through Lin or Chou or others with close access to him) e.g., to what in effect were requests for clearer directives, for more authority to restore order after Mao had decided that that was what he wanted to do. But at no time did the PLA leaders outside Peking seem in a position to make *demands*, to issue ulti-

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*In fact we do not believe that most of China's military men *desire* a military dictatorship. We think that most, like most career Party cadres, are loyalists, disposed to accept whatever arrangements their superiors make, although hoping to be consulted and to have some influence. We think that military leaders would seriously consider attempting to impose a military dictatorship only in the most extreme situation, which it is probably in the power of civilian Party leaders to prevent from occurring.

*A coalition is almost by definition "uneasy," a temporary alliance of individuals and groups with differing predilections and interests—an alliance which is always in danger of deteriorating into purposive, irreconcilable factionalism, and finally into an all-out struggle for power in which the losers lose everything.

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matums, or to do anything more than to provide good counsel and hope that it would be accepted.* This paper has attempted to show why, if those military leaders could do no more then, they can do no more now.

In order to take seriously the proposition that regional and provincial military leaders will somehow be in a position to impose their will on Peking, at some point before the succession takes shape, one must have in hand a credible—at least plausible—scenario. Are we talking about marching men, or the long-distance use of modern weapons against Peking, or alliances between the USSR and various regional leaders, or an invitation to take over after the collapse of public order, or just what?

It seems self-evident that no single MR commander or group of leaders of a single MR (with the possible exception of the Peking MR itself) is strong enough to withstand the military force that could be mobilized against that MR from other MRs. This being so, i.e., that any single MR is comparatively weak even defensively, it would seem to follow that no single MR could possibly succeed in the much more difficult enterprise of conducting a successful *offensive* against the capital, i.e., could march its forces to Peking and hold it under seige in the old civil war style until the leaders in Peking capitulated (in the way that Nationalist General Fu Tso-yi was forced to surrender the capital in 1949). Most of them would never get there.** The Shenyang MR might be thought to be strong enough, with its forces near enough, to worry Peking, but the Peking MR has much greater troop strength, and Peking clearly has confidence in its system of controls over that particular MR, as it has left in command of that MR a leader (Li Te-sheng) whom Chinese officials admit to be in political trouble.

If the leaders of all or most of the MRs were to conspire to move against Peking, the situation would be much more serious, but, as previously noted, the reorganization of eight MRs (including all four of the MRs contiguous to the Peking MR) in December 1973 left the new commanders in a poor position to conspire with other officers of even their own commands, let alone those of other commands. Moreover, attempted conspiracy among the leaders of several MR commands would encounter the problem central to all conspiracies: those who took the initiative in the conspiracy could not afford to guess wrong even once in soliciting fellow-conspirators, and the odds would be heavily against their guessing right every time in the large number of times they would have to guess (in order to raise a sufficient force). Finally, even if the leaders of several MRs could by some miracle conspire successfully, it seems quite unlikely that they could get the bulk of their forces to follow them: new commanders do not inspire personal allegiance, and in any case there are too many controls along the line. In sum, the only MR that the leaders in Peking would seem to have to fear is the Peking MR itself, a special case which fits into the proposition—central to this paper—that the successor leadership will be shaped in Peking, not by any combination of forces outside Peking.

In the nature of things, any group of leaders in Peking has to have a marginal concern about the possibility that bombers and/or nuclear missiles physically located in various MRs could be used against Peking by a disaffected MR leader. The security-minded leaders in Peking are bound to have given this matter some thought, and, while their arrangements are not precisely known, it is believed that there is now a reliable command-and-control system for the Chinese Communist Air Force and a secure system for control of nuclear warheads. It is conceivable that a given MR commander could take physical control of air and missile installations in his area, but he would have to have the cooperation of those who know how to operate the weapons, and this could not be coerced (the dispatched bomber need not drop its bombs, the missile could be launched into the Gobi); in other words, several people would have to go crazy

25X1 *Further, there still has not been a single known instance of successful defiance of Peking on the part of a military leader outside Peking.

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at the same time. Even if this were to happen, the MR conspirators could not have high hopes of doing anything more than knocking out part of Peking; they could not know whether their enemies were even in Peking at that time, and the weapons could not distinguish between friends and enemies. In sum, we agree with what other observers have written: that the complex, integrated command-and-control procedures required to operate strategic systems appear to make any attempt to co-opt portions of these systems for unilateral operations "entirely unrealistic."

A more serious concern for Peking may be that of a challenge by a key MR or a group of MRs *supported by the USSR*, a possibility regarded as strong by some careful and respected observers. In other words, the USSR would provide the dissidents with the capability (which they do not now have) for *sustained* operations. This could be done with or without concurrent ground and/or air operations by Soviet forces. A case can be made that the Soviets, who know both that the Shenyang MR (contiguous to the Peking MR) is second in strength only to the Peking MR and that its commander has reason to be disaffected, are even now assessing the prospects for an operation based on the Shenyang MR. But there are various evident problems, so large that, while Peking may indeed worry, it probably does not have to. Even if the Soviets were to go so far as to make a nuclear strike on Peking to prepare the way for invading forces, and even if any group of Chinese leaders were willing to accept such a strike on Peking as a part of their plan, there would be no way to avoid a prolonged war to which the USSR itself would be a party, and this is not believed to be an attractive option for Moscow. As for the conspiracy itself, the Russians are probably not in a position to take even the first step, i.e., to communicate with the MR leader or leaders in question. Moreover, it seems virtually certain that a group of leaders which did attempt to undertake a joint operation with the Russians against their Chinese comrades would be swiftly overthrown, if not shot on the spot, by their subordinate commanders or political officers. Finally, as previously noted, in discussing the possibility of a Soviet attack on China at a time of high instability, it would be only sensible for the Soviets to wait to see what the leadership looks like after the departure of Mao and Chou, rather than to move precipitately into an action which would not only be likely to fail—uniting the great majority of Chinese against the Soviet-backed insurgents—but would remove any possibility of securing an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations by political means. We do not rule out the possibility of a Soviet-supported military operation, but we regard it as weak, at least for the period through the succession process.

The final possibility to be considered here—relating to MR commanders outside Peking—is that of a collapse of public order, something like the early days of the Cultural Revolution, in which the PLA would again be ordered into action, in which it would again assume a predominant political role in the regions and provinces after restoring order, and after which it would—as it did not, in the Cultural Revolution—magnify its power outside Peking into predominance inside Peking, i.e., impose what would in effect be a military dictatorship. But, as others have noted, the current leaders have taken great care not to allow the "continuation" of the Cultural Revolution—the anti-Lin and anti-Confucius campaign underway throughout 1974 and continuing in 1975—to become a threat to *national* stability (as distinct from instability in the leadership). And there is no apparent capability on the part of the Chinese people, unless incited by the leaders themselves in mass campaigns, to return China to chaos; again, the system of controls is too strong and pervasive. In other words, the current leaders have only themselves to fear, with respect to a collapse of public order; the civilian Party leaders who manage mass campaigns will almost certainly continue to take great care not to have China in a state of chaos in the period of the succession. (Witness the recent emphasis on public order in preparation for the National People's Congress.)

The one MR headquarters which seems in itself to be worth serious and continuing concern, for the leaders in Peking, is that of the Peking MR, which is in Peking—because it is a part of the political security system (in broad terms) and has the largest number of troops which could be brought to bear in a relatively short period in a leadership

crisis. (The immediately available forces are those of the Peking Garrison, stationed inside the city.*)

Here we are talking not about a possible effort by the Peking MR leaders to impose a military dictatorship, but about a possible military-political coalition of some kind to which the Peking MR is in a unique position to contribute. The leaders in Peking have indeed been concerned with this MR, having reorganized it at least three times since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, most recently in December 1973. This MR *might* be in a position to surround Peking and thus to ensure the obedience of the Peking Garrison (e.g., in such matters as arrests of one faction by another faction), or, if necessary, to move against the relatively small Garrison force itself—estimated to total fewer than 30,000—before troops could be brought in from other MRs. (Faced with *de facto* military control of Peking, forces summoned from other MRs might well support—not try to depose—the newly dominant central leaders.) This scenario imputes to the leaders of the Peking MR a higher degree of unity, and a greater ability to command the obedience of their troops in an operation against the capital, than has been conceded to other MR leaders in the foregoing discussion, partly because its forces are *there*, partly because some of its present leaders have been closely associated before, partly because three of them (the commander and the first and second political officers) are themselves members of the inner circle and should have a good sense of the situation they would be moving into, partly because the commander may become concurrently Minister of National Defense and thus in a position to give himself orders recognized by others as legitimate, partly because one probably has a key Garrison post concurrently,* and partly because the use of the forces of the Peking MR in the very special circumstances of a struggle for power would probably not be apparent to those forces as an attack on the central leadership as a whole (and in fact would not be, but would put the MR in the service of one *part* or faction of the leadership). The Commander of the MR (Chen Hsi-lien, a career commander) and its first and second political officers (Chi Teng-kuei, a career Party cadre and a Mao protege who apparently performed better than did Li Te-sheng as a member of the group investigating the Lin Piao affair, and Wu Te, a career Party cadre with experience in political security work) are men whom the present civilian Party leaders obviously believe to be reliable, or they would not be there. However, apart from the fact that previous leaders of this MR thought to be reliable were later found or judged not to be, at the time of the succession the Party leaders will by definition be a different group, i.e., without Mao (and perhaps without Chou too). We do not know enough about the relationships of Chen and Chi and Wu with other Party leaders below the level of Mao and Chou to make a confident judgment as to which of those other leaders might be disposed to call upon the forces of the Peking MR in a leadership crisis (accepting the hazards of bringing the military in), or which group among those leaders Chen and Chi and Wu might take the initiative to support.** None of the three has more than a marginal chance of becoming the next Chairman of the Party, but it is possible

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*The second political officer of the Peking MR is probably still the *first* political officer of the Garrison, as well as first secretary of the Peking Committee, and might himself be able to direct or deflect the Garrison.

**Chi and Wu, as career Party cadres, were and are a part of the effort to subordinate the career military, and might be expected to stand with other career Party cadres in a showdown, i.e., would be valued members of the group which we expect to dominate the central leadership, a group to be discussed presently.

to imagine circumstances in which these leaders of the Peking MR would be in the position of "king-makers." This is *not* to say, as some observers believe, that the PLA as a whole or this MR specifically will necessarily or even probably be in that position. The probability looks to be for an orderly transfer of power, if for no other reason than to remove or reduce the temptation to forces outside Peking (Chinese and/or Russian) to intervene at a time of apparent high instability and vulnerability. But things might just happen in such a way as to put the Peking MR in a critically important position in shaping the succession. This is the only MR which seems to have any such prospect at all.

Prospects

The probability seems to us that Mao and Chou, in the time remaining to them, will continue (as they have since the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973) to try to shape a central Party leadership with which either can work successfully after the death of the other and which can operate successfully as a "collective" after the death of both. Our own view, as previously noted, is that this will be an uneasy coalition, perhaps highly unstable in the short term in the absence of the powerful unifying factors of Mao and Chou; but we think that there is not much that the regional and provincial leaders, notably the military, can do to influence the shape of this central leadership. The six of them (three MR commanders, two MR first political officers, one second political officer) who are full, voting members of the Politburo will probably have some influence as individuals (they are unlikely to act as a bloc) because Mao and Chou are likely to consult with other leaders in making key appointments, and to put some appointments to a vote in the Politburo (Mao himself has said that it does sometimes vote). But the point is that the central leadership will be essentially worked out by the present leaders in Peking, and that, while it will probably continue to include both regional as well as central military leaders, the military is not likely to become the dominant group in the leadership. The leadership will probably be dominated by career Party cadres—not, we think, by the most militant, ideologically-driven and inflexible among them (e.g., Madame Mao and Yao Wen-yuan), but by those who have a better sense of the real world (e.g., Chang Chun-chiao, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiao Kuan-hua, and, probably, young Wang Hung-wen*).

In the period in which the new leadership is being shaped—a period which might run from the next year to the next five years—the regional and provincial leaders would probably do well to stay out of it (apart from offering their opinions when asked), and to try to remain in favor with whatever central leadership is in power at any given time. This means that those who have been under investigation since the Lin Piao affair and have been returned to their posts or given other posts or are still in Peking should do whatever is asked of them, in the way of self-criticism and thought reform and meticulous obedience to Party directives, in the hope of retaining or returning to their regional and provincial posts. In other words, their immediate concern should be survival, in the hope of greater security and greater influence in the days to come.

Most of the current regional and provincial leaders—including most of those who have been in Peking under scrutiny—will probably make it, will survive to see a successor leadership. Some of them, however, will almost certainly fall, unable to persuade the central leaders that they can be trusted. As we see it, the *sure* way for them to be marked for purging is to attempt to intervene in the arrangements being made, to put themselves or others forward as candidates for the central leadership, to press counsel on the central leaders or—the most important thing to avoid—to imply that they will attempt to use the military forces under their command to reshape the leadership if they are dissatis-

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fied with it. If they are careful along these lines, one of the MR headquarters—the Peking MR—may actually be in a position to intervene decisively to influence the shape of the leadership; and the successor leadership—bound to feel less secure than the present leadership—may more actively seek the favor of the regional and provincial leaders, so that they may then have more substantial influence on the decisions made in Peking than they appear to have now.